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1Capitalism, the sustainability crisis, and the
limitations of current business governance
benjamin j. richardson and beate sja˚fjell
1 Impetus for a new direction
This book investigates the limitations of corporate governance and some
related business laws, and their potential reform in furthering environ-
mentally sustainable development, or ‘sustainability’, as this term is more
conveniently known. The central idea is that promoting sustainability
cannot be left solely to corporate volunteerism, but also requires enabling
legal frameworks that go beyond conventional environmental regulation
to ensconce within company law the necessary standards and procedures.
While the book is strongly motivated by the threat of global climate
change, which challenges the traditional assumptions and purpose of
business enterprise over the long term, along withmany other domains of
human endeavour, a range of other environmental problems such as the
loss of biodiversity also suggests that a different approach to business
activity is needed. Arising from the work of the Sustainable Companies
Project, led by Professor Beate Sja˚fjell at the University of Oslo,1 this vol-
ume offersmulti-jurisdictional perspectives from scholars of business and
environmental law. Over eight chapters, a mosaic of analyses, spanning
company law, accounting standards, and financial markets regulation,
identify both the barriers to and the opportunities to promote sustain-
ability in the context of corporations and their financial investors. The
book concludes with some ideas to further ‘sustainable companies’, a
phrase intended to capture the ideal of corporations and other business
entities acting within environmentally sustainable parameters. The focus
of the book is to deepen our understanding of the barriers to creating
sustainable companies, rather than outlining a blueprint for reform. The
1 See jus.uio.no/companies under Projects. The project received funding from the Research
Council of Norway. The project’s broad international scope was made possible through the
academic contributions of the large team of scholars from all around the world, to whom
we express our gratitude and whose work we hereby recognise.
1
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path to reform largely hinges on better understanding of the source and
nature of the problems, and recognition that the tools and strategies for
such reform will vary somewhat across societies and jurisdictions.
Creating sustainable companies has never been more urgent in a world
beset by the intertwined crises afflicting global financial markets and the
planetary environment. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that erupted
in 2008 revealed profound weaknesses in the conventional paradigm of
market finance, and the need to rethink its fundamental tenets and pur-
pose. Another emerging crisis stems from humankind’s degradation of
life-sustaining natural resources with an intensity and speed that threaten
the livelihoods and prosperity not only of future generations, but also of
those alive today. Climate change looms large as the most ominous such
threat. The GFC and environmental crises stem from a different aetiology
but they also share the problem of how short-sighted economic activity
can lead to dangerous long-term problems.
To promote sustainability, it is not sufficient simply to have more envi-
ronmentally efficient businesses, in the sense that companies use fewer
natural resources or emit less pollution relative to their economic activity.
An efficiency standard fails to ensure sustainability when the economy
continues to grow and the human population is increasing. The ‘effi-
ciency’ paradigm also avoids addressing the significant social injustices
in contemporary environmental decision-making. Putting the economy
on a sustainable path requires a more comprehensive and fundamental
strategy that includes rethinking the very purpose and nature of eco-
nomic activity, including that of the dominant business organisation: the
corporation.
This book proceeds from the position that sustainable business should
not be a discretionary preference, to follow only if corporate leaders per-
ceive an economic benefit for their company. All economic activity must
avoid depleting non-substitutable natural capital or creating environmen-
tal externalities. It must invest more in clean, low-carbon technologies,
climate adaptation projects, ecosystem rehabilitation and improvement,
and other ways to build sustainability.2 Economic activity that has public
costs should be accountable for such impacts.
Presently, business enterprise and the wider capitalist system in which
it functions still have a long way to go before it might fulfil this vision.
The movement for corporate social responsibility (CSR) and its offshoot,
2 T. Jackson, Prosperity Without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet (Earthscan, 2009),
138–9.
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socially responsible investing (SRI), have captured only a relatively small
group of committed converts. CSR has a long history in the context of
industrial capitalism, dating back to the nineteenth century in the first
movement for improved labour conditions.3 Its influence has generally
been episodic and fleeting. It has more recently regained prominence as
modernist economic virtues such as efficiency, profits, and maximum
growth have waned in an increasingly cynical world plagued by social and
environmental problems.4 Rejecting the unbridled free market doctrines
of previous years,5 the World Business Council for Sustainable Develop-
ment (WBCSD) explains: ‘Corporate social responsibility is the contin-
uing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to eco-
nomic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce
and their families as well as of the local community and society at large.’6
However, while many investors and business leaders today distance
themselves from the hyperbole of Milton Friedman, who once admon-
ished CSR as one of the ‘[f]ew trends [that] could so thoroughly under-
mine the very foundations of our free society’,7 most are unwilling to
sacrifice profits for environmental gains. The minority of firms and
investors that have embracedCSRhave tended to recast it in anewbusiness
paradigm that views environmental and social issues instrumentally for
potential financial advantage.8 But even this restrictive version of business
responsibility has struggled to attract many followers, partly because of
problems in organisational cultures and difficulties in financially quanti-
fying the business value of improved environmental performance. Rather
3 J.J. Asongu, ‘The history of corporate social responsibility’ (2007) 1(2) Journal of Business
and Public Policy 1.
4 E. Garriga and D. Mele, ‘Corporate social responsibility theories: mapping the territory’
(2004) 53 Journal of Business Ethics 51. D. Birch, ‘Corporate social responsibility: some key
theoretical issues and concepts for new ways of doing business’ (2003) 1(1) Journal of New
Business Ideas and Trends 1.
5 On financial and corporate management attitudes in the 1980s, see A. Smith, The Roaring
’80s (Viking Press, 1988).
6 WBCSD, Corporate Social Responsibility: Meeting Changing Expectations (WBCSD, 1999),
3. Among important CSR literature of recent years, see D. Crowther and L. Rayman-
Bacchus (eds.), Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (Ashgate, 2004); D. Vogel,
TheMarket for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility (Brookings
Institution Press, 2005).
7 M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press, 1962), 133–4.
8 H. Jemel-Fornetty, C. Louche, and D. Bourghelle, ‘Changing the dominant convention:
the role of emerging initiatives in mainstreaming ESG’, in W. Sun, C. Louche, and R. Pe´rez
(eds.), Finance and Sustainability: Towards a New Paradigm? A Post-Crisis Agenda (Emerald
Group, 2011), 85.
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than ask how business might contribute to sustainability, today’s corpo-
ratemanagers aremore likely to self-servingly question how sustainability
might contribute to their firms’ profitability. There is nothing intrinsi-
cally objectionable from benefitting financially from sustainable business
practices; the problem arises when the financial rationale becomes the
only rationale for acting, given that this logic can also work the other way
to encourage environmentally unscrupulous development.
The prevalence of a myopic, single-value approach to commerce and
investmentmay thusmarginaliseCSR strategies that cannot be commuted
into the language of financial risk or profitability. The prevailing belief
in the CSR movement that companies’ ability to manage environmental
risks and opportunities is increasingly relevant to business competitive-
ness, profitability, and organisational competence, while valid, does not
provide a comprehensive framework for sustainable business. Missing
from this perspective is acceptance of an ethical responsibility to act
for environmental well-being, regardless of immediate financial returns.
Dominant globalCSRandSRI standards, such as theUnitedNations Prin-
ciples for Responsible Investment (UNPRI)9 and theUNGlobal Compact
(UNGC),10 lack explicit sustainability performance benchmarks. If fund
managers or business leaders rely only on narrow grounds to act respon-
sibly, then by their own reasoning they would be justified in making an
exception if ignoring those ‘extraneous’ values would be more profitable.
Any commitment to CSR thus remains fragile.
Unsustainable business practices are also attributable to failures of
the legal system. Corporate law is an obstacle, especially its problematic
tendency to view business enterprises as private institutions despite their
often public-like characteristics and social impacts. Under prevailing legal
understandings, this book reveals in Chapter 2 by Millon, and Chapter 3
by Sja˚fjell and others, that business managers cannot easily accommodate
sustainability considerations if they lack economic benefits for the firm
or its shareholders, unless the firm is explicitly established as a non-profit
or mixed-purpose corporation. The legal duties of senior managers and
directors of companies to act to benefit their company’s economic pros-
perity are perceived to exclude consideration of social and environmental
issues unless they can offer financial benefits to the business. There is a
cognate assumption that environmental standards are preferably quar-
antined in separate external regulation as opposed to being incorporated
9 See www.unpri.org. 10 See www.unglobalcompact.org.
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into corporate governance. But as will be explained shortly, modern envi-
ronmental law has had limited success, despite the sincere efforts of many
regulators, judges, and other actors dedicated to the long-termwell-being
of the planet.11
While smarter andmore discrete ‘external’ environmental regulation of
companies and financial institutions may help promote sustainability, we
also need to incorporate such legal measures into economic institutions.
We need to embed environmental standards in the governance of eco-
nomic institutions in order to minimise the tensions their managers face
between reconciling expectations that they act in the public interest while
serving their private constituencies. Fund managers, business managers,
and other economic decision-makers are expected to prioritise profits or
maximise returns to shareholders – goals that create powerful incentives
to avoid paying for environmental externalities. Conversely, environmen-
tal regulation seeks to communicate responsibility for such externalities
and thereby constrain profit-making. By reconciling such mixed mes-
sages, environmental protection could be internalised as a fundamental
norm for investment and business. It should also thereby help improve
compliance with external environmental regulation.
The following section examines the global economic and ecological
predicaments that require that this challenge be addressed urgently.
2 The global economic and ecological crises
Politicians and corporate executives frequently remind us that our well-
being depends on growing the economy.12 Despite its unsustainable
burden on the biosphere, economic growth remains the foremost goal
of nations worldwide. The historic economic trends are truly stagger-
ing. Worldwide consumer expenditure during the last century rose from
US$1.5 trillion in 1900 toUS$24 trillion in 1998.13 Likewise, international
trade in goods and services soared fromUS$50 billion in 1870 toUS$8043
11 For example, S. Wood, G. Tanner, and B.J. Richardson, ‘Whatever happened to Canadian
environmental law?’ (2011) 37(4) Ecology Law Quarterly 981.
12 For example, ‘Flaherty raises economic growth forecast’, CBC News, 2 February 2010,
www.cbc.ca/news/business/flaherty-raises-economic-growth-forecast-1.954083; L.P.
Bloomfield Jr, ‘Corporate investments can help accelerate economic growth in the
developing world’, International Business Times, 19 November 2013, www.ibtimes.com.
13 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1998
(UNDP, 1998), 1.
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billion in 2005.14 Both trends vastly outstripped even the extraordinary
surge in human population from some 1.6 billion in 1900 to 7 billion in
2011. In recent decades, a further economic impetus has come from the
financial sector. The assets of the world’s 1000 largest banks surged from
US$23 trillion in 1990 to approximately US$101 trillion by mid-2010,
despite the headwinds from the GFC.15 In late 2010, the global financial
economy was valued at approximately US$212 trillion.16 Such majestic
statistics suggest we live in an age of great prosperity that has raised living
standards and lifted billions out of poverty.
Apart from the rising economic and social inequalities for some people
that have accompanied such growth, one uncomfortable consequence is
that the global economy has become very large compared to the ecosys-
tems that sustain it. Natural systems provide innumerable economic and
life-support benefits,17 yet humanity acts brazenly as though Earth’s nat-
ural bounty is infinitely abundant and free.18 In The Cancer Stage of
Capitalism, John McMurtry metaphorically depicts this economic plun-
dering as a malignant tumour.19 As ecological economists have more
academically put it, infinite economic and population growth in a phys-
ically finite world is impossible.20 The debate about such ‘limits’ is not
recent; Thomas Malthus raised it in his influential Essay on Population,
published in 1778, and since the early 1970s, numerous scientists have
warned against rampant growth that devours nature.21 Resource scarcities
14 World TradeOrganization (WTO),World Trade Report 2007 (WTO, 2007), 244 (expressed
in constant 1990 dollar values); see also W. Bernstein, A Splendid Exchange: How Trade
Shaped the World (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2008).
15 International Financial Services London (IFSL, now known as TheCityUK), ‘Worldwide
assets of the banking industry’, see also TheCityUK ‘Banking: May 2012, financial markets
series’, available at: www.thecityuk.com/research/our-work/reports-list/.
16 C. Boxburgh, S. Lund, and J. Piotrowski,Mapping Global Capital Markets 2011 (McKinsey
Global Institute, 2011), 2.
17 See G.C. Daily,Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems (Island Press,
1997); Y. Baskin and P.R. Ehrlich, The Work of Nature: How the Diversity of Life Sustains
Us (Island Press, 1998); T. Prugh, et al., Natural Capital and Human Economic Survival
(CRC Press, 1999).
18 Its economic value is undoubtedly staggering, and was quantified by one notorious study
in 1997 at somewhere between US$16–54 trillion annually, dwarfing a then annual global
gross economic product of about US$18 trillion: R. Costanza, et al., ‘The value of the
world’s ecosystem services and natural capital’ (1997) 389 Nature 253.
19 J. McMurtry, The Cancer Stage of Capitalism (Pluto Press, 1999).
20 H. Daly and J.B. Cobb, Jr., For the Common Good (Beacon Press, 1989); H. Daly, Ecological
Economics and the Ecology of Economics (Edward Elgar, 1999); P. Victor,ManagingWithout
Growth (Edward Elgar, 2008).
21 D.H. Meadows, et al., The Limits to Growth (Universe Books, 1972).
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are only part of the problem. There are also limits to the capacity of
environmental ‘sinks’, which serve to assimilate the pollution and other
by-products of economic activity. Climate change is the most severe of
these emerging sink problems.
Soaring ecological problems provoked theUN’sMillenniumEcosystem
Assessment in 2005 to warn that ‘human activity is putting such strain on
the natural functions of the Earth that the ability of the planet’s ecosystems
to sustain future generations can no longer be taken for granted’.22 Many
other international studies echo this view.23 In 2012, scientists spoke of the
risk of ‘threshold-induced state shifts’ in the Earth’s biosphere that could
trigger myriad, unforeseen, devastating consequences for all life.24 With
emerging economies such as China and India rapidly industrialising, and
thereby intensifying the global environmental burden, grave ecological
tipping points may be irreparably passed soon.
These trends are not simply an expression of some carnal human urge
for greater material prosperity – though they do have deep cultural and
biological roots25 – but substantially reflect prevailing economic and
political systems. The market economy is particularly influential. Some
economists laud the market as crucial to human welfare and a tool to
solve our environmental problems, such as by unleashing competitive
pressures to pioneer innovative green technologies, efficiently using scarce
resources, and pricing pollution risks.26 Geoffrey Heal optimistically con-
tends, ‘This poor [environmental] record is not intrinsic tomarkets. They
can be reoriented in a positive direction, in which case their potential
for good is immense.’27 Similarly, through dematerialisation, new tech-
nologies, better management systems, and investment in a knowledge-
based economy, Paul Hawken and others champion a benevolent ‘natural
22 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Living Beyond Our Means: Natural Assets and Human
Well-Being, Statement from the Board (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005) at 5.
23 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Global Environment Outlook GEO-5
(UNEP, 2012); Worldwatch Institute, State of the World 2012: Moving Toward Sustainable
Prosperity (Island Press, 2012).
24 A.D. Barnosky, et al., ‘Approaching a state shift in Earth’s biosphere’ (2012) 486 Nature,
52 at 52.
25 S. Boyden, Western Civilization in Biological Perspective: Patterns in Biohistory (Oxford
University Press, 1987).
26 See generally K. Midgley and R. Burns, The Capital Market: Its Nature and Significance
(Macmillan, 1977).
27 G. Heal, ‘Markets and sustainability’, in R.L. Revesz, P. Sands, and R.B. Stewart (eds.),
Environmental Law, the Economy and Sustainable Development (Cambridge University
Press, 2000), 410 at 427.
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capitalism’ that respects the critical interdependency between the econ-
omy and nature.28 Ecological economists recommend more fundamen-
tal changes that go beyond improved ‘efficiency’ of resource use to
actually limit economic growth.29 They highlight how the market suf-
fers from several environmental blind-spots, including fugitive pollution
‘externalities’,30 degradation of ‘public goods’ such as the atmosphere
and oceans,31 undervaluation of ecological services and amenities such
as biodiversity,32 and myopic decision-making that ignores posterity’s
interests.33
Equally troubling, the cornucopia of material wealth gained from this
growth binge does not necessarily equate with heightened prosperity.
Empirical research suggests that once basic human needs are satiated,
further economic growth yields a diminishing marginal return to human
happiness.34 Economic indicators such asGrossDomestic Product (GDP)
undervalue the contribution of nature to overall well-being.35 Moreover,
much of this growth has delivered uneven benefits, with just a fifth of
humanity earning about 2 per cent of global wealth.36 Some economists
have pioneered alternativemeasures of economic vitality and satisfaction,
suggesting that the seemingly most prosperous nations do not necessarily
enjoy the highest contentment.37
28 P. Hawken, L.H. Lovins, and A. Lovins, Natural Capitalism: Creating the Next Industrial
Revolution (Earthscan, 2000).
29 See, e.g. M. Common and C. Perrings, ‘Towards an ecological economics of sustainability’
(1991) 6Ecological Economics 7; A.M. Jansson, et al. (eds.), Investing inNatural Capital: The
Ecological Economics Approach to Sustainability (Island Press, 1994); Jackson, Prosperity
Without Growth, 5.
30 A.A. John and RA. Pecchenino, ‘International and intergenerational environmental exter-
nalities’ (1997) 99(3) Scandinavian Journal of Economics 371.
31 T. Cowen, Public Goods and Market Failures: A Critical Examination (Transaction Pub-
lishers, 1991).
32 M.Common,Environmental andResource Economics: An Introduction (2nd edn, Longman,
1996), 330–5.
33 Common, Environmental and Resource Economics.
34 WilliamRees documents that recent increases in per capital expenditures onUS healthcare
have not improved the overall health of its population: W.E. Rees, ‘The end (of growth)
is nigh’, paper presented at Ecological Integrity and Sustainable Society Conference
(Dalhousie University, 23–7 June 2007).
35 R. Eisler, The Real Wealth of Nations: Creating a Caring Economics (Berrett-Koehler Pub-
lishers, 2007).
36 Jackson, Prosperity Without Growth, 5.
37 H. Henderson, Ethical Markets; Growing the Green Economy (Chelsea Green Publish-
ing, 2007). Consider alternative measures of prosperity, such as the ‘Index of Sustain-
able Economic Welfare’, www.neweconomics.org, or the ‘Happy Planet Index’, www.
happyplanetindex.org.
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Another crisis, in global financialmarkets, has recently attracted greater
attention frompolicy-makers and business leaders, yet its causes are partly
associatedwith the sameprocesses fuelling the planetary ecological crisis –
namely, excessive risk-taking, failure to incorporate all social costs in the
pricing of financial assets, and the short-term orientation of the market.
Although some commentators believe ‘[t]here is nothing inherent in the
structure of the financial systemwhich necessarily leads to environmental
destruction’,38 such an assumption is largely only plausible at a theoreti-
cal level because it ignores problems such as imperfect information, the
culture of financial organisations, and collective action problems in the
financial industry. The fall-out from the GFC that began in 2008 illus-
trates how excessive risk-taking by financiers can precipitatewide-ranging
economic and social devastation. We are tied to an interconnected global
financial system ‘in which money traverses national capital markets with
dramatic speed and callous scrutiny, bringing with it both the ability
to enhance local economic opportunities or break an economy at its
very core’.39 These impacts are also the product of governance gaps and
weaknesses, as a growing preference since the 1970s for market deregu-
lation has led to diminished state oversight and control of the financial
economy.
The separation of capital and the control of business, the hallmark of
corporate capitalism, has also leveraged the separation between invest-
ment and social responsibility.40 Ease of access to capital through financial
markets removes corporate financing constraints that might otherwise
curb economic growth and thus its environmental consequences. Passive
investors also tend to be physically distant from the activities that directly
impact the environment, thus weakening their sense of responsibility
for taking corrective action. Further fraying the ties between those who
manage companies and those who contribute capital, investors tend to
own tiny fractional stakes in a multitude of companies in their portfolio,
and the ease of selling corporate securities helps diminish the perceived
importance of being a shareholder or creditor to the company. The result
of so many intermediaries is the diminution of the sense of moral agency
of investors for the activities of the companies they fund.
38 M.A.White, ‘Environmental finance: value and risk in an age of ecology’ (1996) 5 Business
Strategy and the Environment 198, at 200.
39 C.J. Mailander, ‘Financial innovation, domestic regulation and the international market-
place’ (1997–98) 31(3)GeorgeWashington Journal of International Law and Economics 341,
at 378.
40 See B.J. Richardson, ‘Putting ethics into environmental law: fiduciary duties for ethical
investment’ (2008) 46(2) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 243.
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Whatever environmental sensitivities investorsmay have, they function
within a financial system whose aim is to mobilise capital through loans
and investments in order for it to deliver a profit (or ‘return’ as investors
call it). Such returns are unlikely to accrue from investing in firms that do
not expand or innovate. Shareholders’ and financiers’ desire for returns
in turn creates pressure on corporations to be profitable in order to
repay creditors or generate returns for shareholders. The recent rise in
financial capital and the decline in natural capital are thus surely not
merely coincidental.
In addition to squandering natural capital, the markets’ contribution
to material prosperity is reproachable. Although investing has the generic
purpose of sacrificing current value and use of existing capital in order
to obtain greater future benefit, the financial system is prone to specu-
lative, ephemeral, and short-term tactics that can undermine long-term
social and economic well-being.41 The dominant paradigm of the finance
system that arose after the 1950s is grounded on several models, particu-
larly the efficientmarket hypothesis, the capital asset pricingmodel for the
trade-off between risk and return, the modern portfolio theory of diver-
sification of investment, and arbitrage pricing theory.42 Over-reliance on
these models, which suffer from some unrealistically simple assumptions
about financial risk and investor behaviour, coupled with regulatory lacu-
nae and laxmarket supervision, has created vulnerabilities in the financial
economy that metamorphosed into the GFC in 2008. Financial crises are
not new, however: a World Bank study identified 112 systemic financial
crises in 93 countries between the late 1970s and 2000.43 The 2008 cri-
sis, however, was of historic breadth and depth, partly because financial
markets have become much more integrated than was the case in earlier
decades. The crisis led to financial bailouts of US$4.89 trillion between
2007 and 2009 in the United States and the European Union (EU), equiv-
alent to 6 per cent of GDP in each country/region.44 By contrast, no
commensurate sense of urgency and commitment of financial resources
have been offered to address global ecological problems.
41 F. Jameson, ‘Culture and finance capitalism’ (1997) 24(1) Critical Inquiry 246, at 247; A.
Harmes, Unseen Power: How Mutual Funds Threaten the Political and Economic Wealth of
Nations (Stoddard, 2001) at 76.
42 C.F. Lee and A.C. Lee (eds.), Encyclopedia of Finance (Springer, 2006).
43 World Bank, Finance for Growth: Policy Choices in a Volatile World (World Bank, 2001).
44 J. Black, Restructuring Global and EU Financial Regulation: Capacities, Coordination and
Learning, Law, Society and Economy Working Paper 18/2010 (London School of Eco-
nomics, 2010), 8.
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Other commentators are hopeful that markets can sort themselves
out. Gordon Clark and Dariusz Wo´jcik praise global finance for reshap-
ing the economic landscape of twenty-first-century capitalism by facili-
tating corporate restructuring, technological innovation, and economic
development.45 They see the growing presence of institutional investors as
a generally positive phenomenon that can help align corporate behaviour
with social norms.Clark andTessaHebb,whosewritings focus onpension
funds, contend these actors have helped re-group dispersed sharehold-
ers with unprecedented concentrations of ownership that enable them to
pressure corporations into raising their business practices and standards
on a range of issues, including transparency, and improving their social
and environmental performance.46 Relatedly, other commentators such
as Robert Monks have observed a willingness of institutional investors
to collaborate in order to amplify their influence over the governance of
their investee firms.47 The voices of institutional funds, whose benefi-
ciaries are millions of ordinary workers and households, are promoting
CSR not only in response to broad societal demands, but also because
they believe improved social and environmental performance may lower
financial risks over the long term.
The capacity and willingness of enlightened investors to nudge the
economy towards sustainability are examined later in this book, in
Richardson’s Chapter 6. Suffice to say at this point that institutional funds
and the SRI movement largely failed to predict the 2008 financial crisis,
let alone do anything to prevent it. Many in the SRI sector have been
preoccupied with ad hoc or specific issues of corporate conduct, while
giving insufficient attention to the structural and systemic dimensions
of the financial economy that are also determinative of progress towards
sustainability. Similarly, as David Millon discusses in Chapter 2, the CSR
movement that focuses on companies in the productive or ‘real’ economy
has struggled to leverage positive change in the environmental behaviour
of companies through voluntary or discretionary initiatives such as CSR
reporting.
Before examining further the barriers and opportunities in corporate
andbusiness law to address these economic andenvironmental challenges,
45 G.L. Clark and D. Wo´jcik, The Geography of Finance: Corporate Governance in the Global
Marketplace (Oxford University Press, 2007).
46 G.L. Clark and T. Hebb, ‘Pension fund corporate engagement: the fifth stage of capitalism’
(2004) 59(1) Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations 141.
47 R.A.G. Monks, The New Global Investors: How Shareowners Can Unlock Sustainable Pros-
perity Worldwide (Capstone, 2001).
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it is important to pause and consider the limitations of conventional
environmental regulation. Why can we not just rely on such regulation to
discipline environmentally irresponsible companies?
3 Environmental law in the dyadic state
The assumption that the environmental activities and impacts of busi-
ness can be successfully improved through external regulation rather
than through company law or other areas of business law is doubt-
ful. Ostensibly, environmental law has blossomed in many countries
over the past half-century as governments have legislated to curb pollu-
tants, protect endangered species, and restrict the exploitation of nature’s
scarce or finite resources. However, all states have struggled to disci-
pline humankind’s environmentally wanton behaviours because those
behaviours, especially through industry and the marketplace, also deliver
material prosperity and sustain the states themselves. This is the outcome
even when we increasingly recognise that plundering nature’s capital
will eventually deprive business of the capacity to create new, economic
capital. These contradictory tendencies between the need for environ-
mental protection (in the long term) and allowing its exploitation for
economic development (in the short term) are central to understand-
ing the dyadic or conflictual character of the modern state charged
with regulating business. The following pages thus delve into the lim-
itations of environmental law in order to help us understand this book’s
agenda about the imperative for a supplementary means of governing
the source of our most serious environmental pressures: the business
sector.
Depressingly, global environmental conditions have generally deteri-
orated despite the vast swathe of environmental regulations enacted in
manynations in recentdecades.Wecontinue to edge closer to theprecipice
of an anthropogenic collapse in planetary ecological systems. Species are
disappearing at unprecedented rates and the planet’s sixth mass extinc-
tion is forecast,48 while atmospheric carbon dioxide is at its highest level
in some 800,000 years, and is rising rapidly.49 We should not be misled
by the law’s occasional triumphs, such as the phasing out of atmospheric
48 A.D. Barnosky, et al., ‘Has the Earth’s sixth mass extinction already arrived?’ (2011) 471
Nature 51.
49 ‘First time in 800,000 years: April’s CO2 levels above 400 ppm’. CBS News, 6 May 2014,
www.cbsnews.com/news/first-time-in-800000-years-aprils-co2-levels-above-400-ppm.
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ozone-depleting chemicals50 or the rescue of iconic species from the brink
of extinction.51 At most, we can concede that environmental law is mod-
estly mitigating what would be a more dire situation.
While the subject of environmental law deserves much more compre-
hensive treatment and we should be mindful of differences in its design
and impact among jurisdictions, especially between the rich developed
countries and the poorer nations of theGlobal South, some general trends
canbeobservedhere.Until now, environmental lawhas tended to function
as external controls on economic activity rather than as norms embed-
ded within the inner institutional structure of companies, financiers,
and other economic agents. These entities have had to obtain licences
or other approvals to harvest resources, pollute, or commit other envi-
ronmental impacts, overseen by a labyrinth of administrative agencies
and procedures. The function of environmental law, therefore, remains
limited to mitigating the worst excesses of the dominant model of eco-
nomic development rather than fundamentally challenging or transform-
ing it. It is rare for a major project, especially one that promises jobs
and other economic benefits, to be vetoed in the name of protecting
nature.
The efficacy of environmental law has been undermined by the conver-
gence of several negative factors, including its political-economic context
and itsmethodsof governance,52 in addition tomore fundamental charac-
teristics of humankind’s evolutionary disposition.53 Themodern environ-
mental administrative state is structured largely to legalise environmental
damage, for under most legislation, the governing agency has the autho-
rity – or discretion – to permit the very pollution or resource destruction
that the regulations were drafted to prevent or reduce. Further, within
this context, government agencies often confront and succumb to
political pressure and lobbying by vested interest groups, especially the
corporations they are supposed to police, in order to issue permits
50 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, ILM 28, 1989, 649.
51 A notable example is the American Bald Eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus), the national
symbol of the United States, which was saved by the Endangered Species Preservation Act,
Pub. L. 89–669, 1966.
52 See e.g. D. Boyd, Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policy
(UBC Press, 2003); B.A. Ackerman and R.B. Stewart, ‘Reforming environmental law: the
democratic case for market incentives’ (1985) 37 Stanford Law Review 1333; A. Gillespie,
The Illusion of Progress: UnsustainableDevelopment in International Law (Earthscan, 2001).
53 B.J. Richardson, ‘A damp squib: environmental law from a human evolutionary perspec-
tive’ (2011) 3 Law and Prosociality eJournal.
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and sanction other harmful actions.54 Areas set aside for strict nature
conservation, such as national parks, usually reflect such areas’ perceived
weaker economic value for mining, forestry, human settlement, or other
developments, rather than any unadulterated ethical commitment to
nature’s sanctity.
The target of environmental regulation can also be misguided. It tends
to focus on the ‘front-line’ companies (e.g. manufacturing firms or min-
ing companies) that most visibly pollute or exploit natural resources,
rather than their financial sponsors, such as global banks or multina-
tional companies shielded behind subsidiaries that become the ‘fall guy’
for any environmental problems. The latter have been viewed as systemi-
cally remote from these environmental and social consequences,55 despite
the capital they provide and their ability as shareholders or creditors to
voice concerns to the firms they aid. Causal relationships between finance
and environmental impacts are separated widely across time and space,
frequently obscuring holistic responsibility for the degradation.
States tend not to favour stringent environmental regulation because
their political fortunes hinge more on their success as economic man-
agers than as environmental stewards, despite a growing environmental
movement in many countries. Driven by the imperatives of national
housekeeping, the state acts as the ‘parens patriae’ with responsibility to
sustain economic growth.56 Yet, because economic activity can also pro-
duce politically contentious environmental impacts, the state must rec-
oncile the antagonistic imperatives of curbing the worst pollution while
allowing market actors enough freedom to grow the economy.57 Unre-
solved contradictions between these imperatives have prompted major
disputes over forestry, nuclear power, mining, and other resource issues
in recent decades.58 Governments have sought to manage their conflicted
54 One notorious example is the Gunns’ pulp mill proposal in northern Tasmania, Australia,
a development allegedly approved by state and federal governments because of the political
influence of Gunns, a major forestry company: Q. Beresford, ‘Corporations, government
anddevelopment: the case of institutional corruption inTasmania’ (2010) 45(2)Australian
Journal of Political Science 209.
55 J. Rada and A. Trisoglio, ‘Capital markets and sustainable development’ (1992) 27
Columbia Journal of World Business 42; W. Thomas, ‘The green nexus: financiers and
sustainable development’ (2001) 13 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review
899.
56 See H. Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press, 1957).
57 See K.Walker, ‘The state in environmental management: the ecological dimension’ (1989)
37(1) Political Studies 25.
58 For example, R. Falkner,Business Power andConflict in International Environmental Politics
(PalgraveMacmillan, 2007); I. Watson, Fighting Over the Forests (Allen and Unwin, 1990).
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roles and the attendant challenges to their legitimacy by devolving more
authority to market actors.59 Particularly since the 1980s, states have
increasingly privatised public services and assets and liberalised market
controls in the hope of reducing the regulatory burden on industry and
creating more opportunities to harness market efficiencies.60 This strat-
egy, however, carries its own risks. The GFC of 2008–2009 led govern-
ments worldwide to intervene to restore market stability in a way not seen
since the Great Depression.61 By contrast, the looming crisis of climate
change prompted only a lukewarm political accord in Copenhagen in
2009.62
The effectiveness of environmental law is blunted not only by its polit-
ical and economic context, but also itsmethods. The rise of modern envi-
ronmental regulation in the countries of the West was closely associated
with the norms and institutions of the welfare state, including reliance
on instruments of public ownership and prescriptive standards.63 While
these techniques helped mitigate such acute pollution problems as water
pollution and lead in petrol, their ability to solve complex environmen-
tal issues is increasingly in doubt.64 The main elements of the critique
are now quite familiar:65 the conventional techniques of ‘command and
control’ regulation were too rigid, complex, burdensome, costly, ineffi-
cient, adversarial, and ineffective; they stifled entrepreneurial innovation,
eliminated jobs, and hindered competitiveness in return for diminishing
environmental benefits; and they were prone to industry capture. Their
proliferation resulted in a dense maze of legal controls, the effectiveness
of which was increasingly outweighed by their administrative costs and
economic burden, threatening finally to collapse under their own weight
59 D. Boaz and E. Crane (eds.), Market Liberalism: A Paradigm for the 21st Century (Cato
Institute, 1993).
60 B. Bortolotti and D. Siniscalco, The Challenges of Privatization: An International Analysis
(Oxford University Press, 2004).
61 ‘Adding up the government’s total bailout tab’,New York Times, 4 February 2009, available
at: www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/02/04/business/20090205-bailout-totals-graphic
.html.
62 ‘Copenhagen Accord climate pledges too weak: UN’ (31 March 2010) Reuters, available
at: www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62U13M20100331.
63 C. Sunstein, ‘Paradoxes of the regulatory state’ (1990) 57University of Chicago Law Review
407; M. Moran, ‘Understanding the regulatory state’ (2002) 32 British Journal of Political
Science 391.
64 See e.g. P. Yeager, The Limits of Law: The Public Regulation of Private Pollution (Cambridge
University Press, 1991).
65 See e.g. C. Abbott, ‘Environmental command regulation’, in B.J. Richardson and S. Wood
(eds.), Environmental Law for Sustainability (Hart Publishing, 2006), 61.
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or to seize up in a process of ‘juridification’.66 According to one influential
account, ‘The present regulatory system wastes tens of billions of dollars
every year, misdirects resources, stifles innovation, and spawns massive
and often counterproductive litigation.’67 While this is not an accurate
depiction of all environmental regulation, which sometimes has been
characterised by a consultative style in which environmental rules were
negotiated and enforced in a largely non-coercive way via closed-door,
bilateral deals between government and industry,68 it does reflect much
of the history of modern environmental law.
In recent decades, criticisms of the efficacy of the regulatory state
and its reliance on coercive prescriptive regulation have fostered exper-
imentation with alternate approaches that cede some responsibility for
environmental governance to the market or civil society. These realign-
ments have been described by commentators using various terms, such
as ‘mutual regulation’,69 ‘self-organisation’,70 ‘responsive regulation’,71
‘smart regulation’,72 and ‘post-regulatory governance’.73 Among the com-
mon elements of these so-called ‘decentred’ forms of regulation are the
preference for legal systems that are ‘less heavy-handed, andmore respon-
sive to the demands and possibilities of their context’,74 and also, the
66 G. Teubner, ‘Juridification: concepts, aspects, limits, solutions’, in R. Baldwin, C. Scott,
and C. Hood (eds.), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1998), 389 at 398.
67 Ackerman and Stewart, ‘Reforming environmental law’, 1333.
68 M. Howlett, ‘Policy instruments and implementation styles: the evolution of instrument
choice’, in D. Van Nijnatten and R. Boardman (eds.), Canadian Environmental Policy:
Context and Cases (Oxford University Press, 2002), 25.
69 See P. Simmons and B. Wynne, State, Market and Mutual Regulation? Socioeconomic
Dimensions of the Environmental Regulation of Business (Lancaster University, 1994).
70 G. Teubner, L. Farner, and D. Murphy (eds.), Environmental Law and Ecological Respon-
sibility: The Concept and Practice of Ecological Self-Organisation (John Wiley & Sons Ltd,
1994).
71 I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate
(Oxford University Press, 1992).
72 N. Gunningham and P. Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy
(Oxford University Press, 1998).
73 C. Scott, ‘Regulation in the age of governance: the rise of the post regulatory state’, in
J. Jordana and D. Levi-Faur (eds.), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory
Reforms for the Age of Governance (Edward Elgar, 2004), 145.
74 J. Steele and T. Jewell, ‘Law in environmental decision-making’, in T. Jewell and J. Steele
(eds.), Law in Environmental Decision-Making. National, European and International Per-
spectives (Clarendon Press, 1998), 1 at 14; see further, D. Osborne and T. Gaebler, Rein-
venting Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector
(Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1992); J. Black, ‘Decentring regulation: understanding the
role of regulation and self-regulation in a “post-regulatory world”’ (2001) 54Current Legal
Problems 103.
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enlistment of non-state actors in regulatory governance. Gunther Teub-
ner describes reflexive law as one of these approaches – a system of regula-
tion that does not seek coercive policy direction but confines itself to the
‘regulation of organization, procedures and the redistribution of compe-
tences’.75 With the vision that governance should no longer arise out
of external regulation but should occur through the internal reconfigu-
ration of decision-making within corporations, detailed regulatory pre-
scription is thus replaced bymechanisms encouraging internal reflection,
learning, and behavioural changes. Thus, the function of law is recast
from direct control to ‘procedural’ control.76 For environmental policy,
Eric Orts describes reflexive law as seeking ‘to encourage internal self-
critical reflection within institutions about their environmental perfor-
mance . . . to set up processes that encourage institutional self-reflective
thinking and learning about environmental effects’.77 Similar reflexive law
approaches have been used in business law, with regard to CSR report-
ing, for instance. Thus, many jurisdictions are increasingly relying on
informational policy instruments, norms of self-governance, economic
incentives, and contractual agreements to govern markets.78
But their effectiveness in promoting sustainability has not yet been
demonstrated. Instead, they have served to reduce pressure on the regula-
tory system by offering a more efficient and cost-effective environmental
governance. These mechanisms leave unaltered the basic assumptions
about the purpose and value of economic development, fail to provide
tools to steer the economy towards long-term horizons, and fail to pro-
vide a mechanism to scale the economy within biosphere limits. They
can nudge change and deliver incremental improvements, as evident
in gradual improvements in corporate environmental accounting and
reporting (discussed in Chapter 5 by Villiers and Ma¨ho¨nen in this book),
75 G. Teubner, ‘Social order from legislative noise? Autopoietic closure as a problem for legal
regulation’, in G. Teubner (ed.), State, Law, Economy as Autopoietic Systems: Regulation and
Autonomy in a New Perspective (Giuffre`, 1992); G. Teubner, ‘After legal instrumentalism?’
in G. Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 222.
76 J. Black, ‘Proceduralising regulation: Part I’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 597.
77 E.W.Orts, ‘Reflexive environmental law’ (1995) 89(4)Northwestern University LawReview
1227, at 1254.
78 See D.A. Farber, ‘Taking slippage seriously: noncompliance and creative compliance in
environmental law’ (1999) 23 Harvard Environmental Law Review 297; A. Iles, ‘Adaptive
management: making environmental law and policy more dynamic, experimentalist and
learning’ (1996) 13Environmental and Planning Law Journal 288; E.W.Orts andK.Dekete-
laere (eds.), Environmental Contracts: Comparative Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in
the United States and Europe (Kluwer Law, 2000).
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but do not engender the kind of comprehensive change that is urgently
needed.
Other regulatory failures and gaps that contribute to unsustainabil-
ity inhere in business law, including companies legislation, securities
regulation, and financial markets controls, whose effects are critiqued
later in this book. In these domains, the primary problem is the gen-
eral lack of environmental standards, rather than misguided standards
or insufficient enforcement. The deregulation of financial markets since
the 1980s has generally aimed to lighten legislative restrictions to be
replaced by disclosure standards and self-regulation under government
supervision.79 The expansion of the CSR and SRI movements in recent
yearsmay charitably be viewed as a surrogate governance strategy to com-
pensate for deficiencies in official business regulation in these domains.80
However, we can also view these movements less charitably as attempts to
thwart stricter regulatory standards throughpre-emptive actionbymarket
actors.81
Transnationally, an even larger regulatory lacuna exists.Global environ-
mental rules are typically quarantined within designated ‘environmental
treaties’, such as those governingbiodiversity conservationor transbound-
ary pollution, and their implementation has tended to be poor.82 Con-
versely, treaties governing investment and other economic activities are
largely devoid of sustainability considerations. Market liberalisation and
technological advances have greatly accelerated themobility and liquidity
of financial capital across national borders, and consequently the capac-
ity for more unsustainable development.83 Largely missing from these
policy prescriptions are mechanisms to ensure that transnational firms
and their investors who benefit from the liberal economic framework
adhere to high standards of corporate governance and environmental
responsibility. While globalisation has helped disseminate and univer-
salise voluntary standards for CSR and business ethics, ‘hard’ regulation
of foreign investment, banking, and capital markets at an international
79 On Canadian reforms, see A.M. Abdalyan, ‘The Porter Commission Report revisited’
(1995) 11 Banking and Finance Law Review 57, at 64.
80 R. Aguilera, et al., ‘Corporate governance and social responsibility: a comparative analysis
of the UK and the US’ (2006) 14(3) Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility 147.
81 B. Sja˚fjell, ‘Report fromNorway: another CSR victory for the business lobbyists’, available
at: SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1413388.
82 Gillespie, The Illusion of Progress.
83 C. Williams, ‘Corporate social responsibility in an era of economic globalization’ (2002)
35 University of California Davis Law Review 705, at 731.
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level remains sparse and deeply fragmented.84 The corporate hostility to
the relatively stringent proposed UN Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations in 2003 illustrates how many business actors
view credible regulation of their social and environmental activities.85
The human rights standards subsequently adopted by the UN in 2011
from the Ruggie process are comparatively much milder for business.86
The GFC has provokedmuch debate among policy-makers, academics,
and other observers about the future governance of the global economy,
but so far politicians have struggled to agree to long-term solutions.
Mainly ad hoc, expedient, or temporary measures have been adopted,
such as controls on short-selling, tighter regulation of financial deriva-
tives, closer scrutiny of lending conditions, and bail-outs and partial
nationalisations of insolvent financial institutions.87 The measures have
tended to serve restoration of business-as-usual rather than engineer-
ing fundamental, structural reforms. The environmental sustainability
agenda has hardly featured in these policy-making discussions, with the
UN initiative, the ‘Global Green New Deal’, quickly fizzling out.88
In conclusion, around the world, the environmental law for the front-
line companies in the productive economy has generally been of limited
success, and environmental standards have hardly extended to the finan-
cial economy or corporate governance. Serious deficiencies in the capacity
and willingness of states to regulate the market for sustainability exist. In
developing an alternative governance model, to mitigate the deficien-
cies of external environmental regulation and the limitations of business
voluntarism, it is important to clarify the meaning of sustainability and
84 See generally, K. Alexander, R. Dhumale, and J. Eatwell, Global Governance of Financial
Systems (Oxford University Press, 2006).
85 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Sub-Commission on Promotion and Pro-
tection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (ECOSOC, 2003).
86 J. Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, HRC 17th Session, UN Doc A/HRC/
17/31 (2011).
87 K. Davis, Regulatory Reform post the Global Financial Crisis: An Overview (Australian
Centre for Financial Studies, 2011).
88 UN Environmental Programme (UNEP), ‘Global Green New Deal – Environmentally-
Focused Investment Historic Opportunity for 21st Century Prosperity and Job Genera-
tion’, Press release, 22 October 2008; available at www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/
Default.asp?DocumentID=548&ArticleID=5957; E. B. Barbier , ‘Green stimulus is not
sufficient for a global green recovery’,Vox, 3 June 2010, available at: www.voxeu.org/index.
php?q=node/5134. For more about UNEP’s recent green economy efforts, see www.unep.
org/greeneconomy.
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its manifestation in the notion of the ‘sustainable company’, which is
discussed in Section 4.
4 Sustainability and the ‘sustainable company’
The concept of ‘sustainability’ emerged in the late twentieth century as the
Zeitgeist of environmental policy and law. In its most prevalent formu-
lation, ‘sustainable development’, it has been widely endorsed as the goal
of states, international bodies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
and the business community itself. Sustainability has been enshrined in
the European Union’s Treaty as a core objective,89 and it features in many
international environmental conventions, multilateral development poli-
cies, national environmental strategies, and legislation.90 In the context
of business enterprise, sustainability has been incarnated in the motifs
of ‘sustainable companies’, ‘sustainable finance’, and similar phrases that
imply economic activity within acceptable environmental parameters.91
The CSRmovement, as discussed inMillon’s Chapter 2, is also now deeply
infused with the rhetoric of sustainability.
In contrast to the older terminology of environmentalists who spoke
of ‘nature conservation’, the sustainability discourse seeks to integrate the
environmental, social, and economic agendas. It advocates a responsi-
ble balance between the otherwise incongruous imperatives of unfettered
economic exploitation of natural resources and the dependence of all life
on healthy ecosystems. A stronger version of the concept would prioritise
the maintenance of ecological integrity as a precondition to economic
and social development.92 Sustainability is supported by several specific
89 Treaty on European Union (1992), last amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, OJ 2008 C115
(consolidated version), Art. 3; B. Sja˚fjell, ‘Quo vadis, Europe? The significance of sustain-
able development as objective, principle and rule of EU law’, in C. Bailliet (ed.),Non State
Actors, Soft Law and Protective Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 254.
90 C. Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law: Resolving Conflicts
BetweenClimateMeasures andWTOLaw (MartinusNijhoff, 2009);M.C.Cordonier Segger
and A. Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law: Principles, Practices, and Prospects (Oxford
University Press, 2005); S.A. Atapattu, Emerging Principles of International Environmental
Law (Transnational Publishers, 2006); R.L. Revesz, P. Sands, and R.B. Stewart (eds.),
Environmental Law, the Economy and Sustainable Development: The United States, the
European Union and the International Community (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
91 M. Jeucken, Sustainable Finance and Banking: The Financial Sector and the Future of the
Planet (Earthscan, 2001).
92 E. Neumayer,Weak Versus Strong Sustainability (4th edn, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013).
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107337978.003
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Deakin University, Australia (Books), on 12 Mar 2017 at 23:06:54, subject to the
capitalism, sustainability, business governance 21
policy principles that give it some operational traction. The ‘polluter pays’
principle expects polluters to bear the expenses of pollution prevention
and remediation.93 The precautionary principle addresses acting in situ-
ations of uncertainty regarding the environmental risks of development
choices.94 Sustainability also adheres to principles of social justice by
requiring the fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of environ-
mental policy, as reflected in the cognate principles of inter- and intra-
generational equity.95
Sustainability concepts have ostensibly informed vast swathes of mod-
ern environmental governance andpolicy.96 These efforts include strategic
environmental plans, framework laws, and reconfigured regulatory agen-
cies, policy tools such as pollution taxation and environmental liability,
as well as democratic reforms widening participation in environmen-
tal decision-making.97 Many environmental statutes and codes explicitly
proclaim sustainability as their purpose, such as Nova Scotia’s Environ-
mental Goals and Sustainable Prosperity Act 2007 and the German Sus-
tainability Code, 2011. New Zealand’s pioneering Resource Management
Act 1992was perhaps the first such example, declaring that ‘the purpose of
this Act is to promote the sustainablemanagement of natural and physical
resources’.98 Considerable effort since has been expended devising tools
to implement such aspirations, and setting ‘sustainability indicators’ to
measure progress.99 Overall, the sustainability paradigm supports a more
principled and strategic approach to environmental policy in contrast to
earlier more fragmented efforts.
93 OECD, The Polluter Pays Principle: OECD Analyses and Recommendations (OECD, 1992).
94 N. de Sadeleer (ed.), Implementing the Precautionary Principles: Approaches from theNordic
Countries, the EU and USA (Earthscan, 2007).
95 I. Voinovic, ‘Intergenerational and intragenerational equity requirements for sustainabil-
ity’ (1995) 22(3) Environmental Conservation 223; J.E. Roemer, Intergenerational Equity
and Sustainability (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
96 See K. Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance
(Ashgate, 2008).
97 J.C. Dembach, ‘Sustainable development as a framework for national governance’ (1998)
49(1) Case Western Reserve Law Review 1; K. Ginther, et al. (eds.), Sustainable Develop-
ment and Good Governance (Graham and Trotman; Martinus Nijhoff, 1995); G.C. Bryner,
‘Policy devolution and environmental law: exploring the transition to sustainable devel-
opment’ (2002) 26 Environs: Environmental Law and Policy Journal 1.
98 Section 5(1).
99 S. Bell and S. Morse, Sustainability Indicators: Measuring the Immeasurable (Earthscan,
1999).
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Part of sustainability’s appeal is its ambiguity and open-endedness,
enabling numerous actors with divergent objectives to commonly em-
brace it.100 The success of the sustainability ideal also derives from how
the business and political elites have tamed its broad possible implica-
tions to avoid radical economic changes. The prevailing rhetoric seeks
to reassure us that environmental protection and economic growth can
mutually reinforce each other.101 Sustainability is presented as supporting
the means to gain competitive advantages and to build new markets and
improve production efficiency, rather than imposing rigid ecological lim-
its on business activity.102 It also implies soft business advantages, such as
improved relations with employees and local communities, and therefore
fewer costly disputes.103
Also in this business context, the sustainability paradigm has been
closely associated with the philosophy of ‘ecological modernisation’, a
potent influence on environmental law andpolicy.104 Ecologicalmoderni-
sation accepts environmental degradation as a by-product of our modern
industrial ‘risk’ society,105 but believes that degradation can be mitigated
through rational and technocratic methods. Ecological modernisation
therefore does not renounce capitalism. Rather, it promises more effi-
cient and careful husbandry of environmental resources, implemented
through a framework of industrial modernity that harnesses innova-
tive technologies, business acumen, and managerial professionalism.106
100 A.D. Basiago, ‘Methods of defining sustainability’ (1995) 3 Sustainable Development 109;
K. Pezzoli, ‘Sustainable development: a transdisciplinary overviewof the literature’ (1997)
40(5) Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 549.
101 On the potential symbiosis of environmental and economic concerns, see M.E. Porter
and V. der Linde, ‘Green and competitive: ending the stalemate’ (1995) 73(5) Harvard
Business Review 120.
102 For example,WBCSD andUNEP,Cleaner Production and Eco-Efficiency: Complementary
Approaches to Sustainable Development (WBCSD, 1998).
103 M. Grieg-Gran, Financial Incentives for Improved Sustainability Performance: The Business
Case and the Sustainability Dividend (Institute for the Environment and Development,
WBCSD, 2002), 5–6.
104 For a discussion of the central tenets of ecological modernization, see M.S. Andersen and
I. Massa, ‘Ecological modernization: origins, dilemmas and future directions’ (2000) 2
Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 337; M. Hajer, The Politics of Environmental
Discourse: EcologicalModernisation and the Policy Process (OxfordUniversity Press, 1995);
S. Young (ed.), The Emergence of Ecological Modernisation: Integrating the Environment
and the Economy? (Routledge, 2000).
105 U. Beck, Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk, trans. A. Weisz (Polity Press, 1995).
106 See especially J. Huber, Die verlorene Unschuld der Okologie (Fischer Verlag, 1982); M.
Ja¨nicke, Staatsversagen. DieOhnmacht der Politik in der Industriegesellschaft (Piper, 1986).
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Thus, pollution prevention and sustainable practices can yield competi-
tive advantages for companies.107 This outlook also informs the business
case model of CSR, which depicts environmental constraints as oppor-
tunities for higher profitability through more frugal use of resources
or less costly pollution. Therefore, ecological modernisation, like many
understandings of sustainability, deftly reframes the ethical and political
dilemmas of industrialisation as primarily technical and entrepreneurial
challenges.108 Legally, this stance also supports changes in environmental
governance towards ‘smart regulation’,109 whereby the state partners the
market through negotiated agreements, economic instruments, auditing,
reporting, and management systems rather than seeking change through
inflexible regulatory prescriptions.
This incremental and reformist approach to sustainable development
has not gone uncontested. The anti-globalisation movement represents
the most visible form of resistance.110 Diverse campaigns by civil society
advocacy networks have exposed the environmental and social impacts of
firms and investors, keeping their influence on the sustainable develop-
ment discourse somewhat in check.111 The post-GFC ‘OccupyMovement’
has extended this discontent to the sustainability of the financial economy
and its crippling social and economic impacts.112 Activists in the Global
South also have censured some of the Western proponents of sustainabil-
ity for glossing over the social justice dimensions of the environmental
agenda, such as more equitable global trade and poverty alleviation.113
Likewise, this book’s advocacy of ‘sustainable companies’ is informed
by a critical stance that views the planetary environmental crisis as requir-
ing fundamental changes in the governance and purpose of business
107 See further, J. Elkington, ‘Towards the sustainable corporation: win-win-win business
strategies for sustainable development’ (1994) 36(2) California Management Review 90.
108 S. Baker, ‘The evolution of European Union environmental policy’, in S. Baker, et al.
(eds.), The Politics of Sustainable Development: Theory, Policy and Practice within the
European Union (Routledge, 1997), 91 at 96.
109 Gunningham and Grabosky, Smart Regulation; J. Elias and R. Lee, ‘Ecological moderni-
sation and environmental regulation: corporate compliance and accountability’, in S.
MacLeod (ed.), Global Governance and the Quest for Justice. Volume 2: Corporate Gover-
nance (Hart Publishing, 2006), 163.
110 N. Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies (Vintage Canada, 2000).
111 D. Szablowski,Transnational Lawand Local Struggles:Mining, Communities and theWorld
Bank (Hart Publishing, 2007) at 64.
112 Writers for the 99%, Occupying Wall Street: The Inside Story of an Action That Changed
America (OR Books, 2011).
113 V. Shiva, Earth Democracy: Justice, Sustainability and Peace (Southend Press, 2005).
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enterprise. The hallmarks of a sustainable company are that it is pro-
cedurally managed in a more transparent and democratic manner, and
substantively it is accountable to robust environmental performance stan-
dards. A sustainable company also functions within a market system that
likewise is restructured along these principles.
Of course, sustainability is not simply a matter of environmental pro-
tection and improvement. It has important social justice dimensions,
such as respect for basic human rights and social justice. Environmen-
tal management is not just about humankind’s relationship with nature
but also involves the relations among stakeholders over access to scarce
resources and the distribution of environmental benefits and burdens.
For example, the livelihood of indigenous peoples and their land rights
and other legal claims are often closely intertwined with environmental
protection.114 The principle of intra-generational equity most directly
engages with sustainability’s social dimensions.
However, the analysis and reforms proposed by this book focus on sus-
tainability’s environmental side for several reasons. Notably, social con-
cerns such as the abuse of human rights will sometimes motivate stake-
holders to be more willing to speak out, protest, or initiate legal action,
because those stakeholders’ personal well-being is directly affected or
because other people’s suffering is easier to empathise with than nature’s
voiceless distress. By contrast, the environment, especially its long-term
integrity, indeed tends to be a mute stakeholder, unable to represent
itself except indirectly through environmental NGOs who advocate on its
behalf.While some environmental problems directly threaten individuals,
such as pollution of one’s property or person, and often disproportion-
ately bring suffering to the poorest and vulnerable,115 in many cases,
the impacts are so widely dispersed across space or time that they lack
sufficient proximity to motivate people to take costly action. In particu-
lar, the long-term interests of future generations in environmental well-
being are less likely to be represented in public policy debates or business
decision-making than the immediate interests of people alive. Because
many environmental impacts are irreversible, such as climate change or
species extinction, it would not be possible for future generations to
obtain justice retroactively. Thus, there is a strong moral imperative to
114 B.J. Richardson, ‘The ties that bind: indigenous peoples and environmental governance’,
in B.J. Richardson, S. Imai, and K. McNeil (eds.), Indigenous Peoples and the Law: Com-
parative and Critical Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2009), 337.
115 R. Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (MIT Press, 2011).
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address sustainability’s environmental dimensions at their inception in
business and economic decision-making.
Legally incorporating environmental sustainability into the purpose
and decision-making of companies, however, is not without some serious
challenges. Sustainability is neither a blueprint nor a manual to apply
mechanically – rather, it is malleable because its parameters and applica-
tion require further reflection on each specific context. Asking whether a
specific activity is environmentally sustainable will yield different answers
depending on the time and place. One might condemn as utterly unsus-
tainable a polluting factory sited adjacent to a biologically diversewetland,
while the same facility placed in a remote desert largely devoid of lifemight
evoke less concern. Another way to understand the importance of context
is that an environmentally problematic activity practised by 100 compa-
nies might be of some concern, but their impact is dramatically amplified
when in a growing economy 1000 companies are culprits. We thus often
cannot measure the sustainability of corporate behaviour without a flexi-
ble, case-by-case approach. Additionally, obliging corporate managers to
be more responsive to their environmental performance may pose cog-
nitively challenging problems of reconciling seeming incommensurables.
The incommensurability issue refers to the difficulty of comparing and
synthesising different values into business decision-making. If a corpo-
rate manager is obliged both to seek profitability for shareholders while
taking into account environmental costs, how can those dissimilar val-
ues be understood in a common metric to enable coherent, integrated
decision-making?
In meeting these challenges, business law needs to promote decision-
making approaches that are sufficiently flexible and adaptable, yet not so
unbounded as to leave corporations and their investors unaccountable or
unable to reconcile seemingly competing economic and environmental
considerations.Weneedprocesses thatneitherprivilegemorally absolutist
judgements about environmental protection nor leave decision-makers
with open-ended discretion. Rigid, absolutist stances about appropri-
ate corporate environmental conduct are rarely useful except in relation
to prohibiting intrinsically dangerous environmental practices such as
manufacturing certain toxic chemicals. Simplistic moral slogans such
as ‘respect the intrinsic value of nature’116 tend to hinder ‘genuine
116 J. Pietarinen, ‘The principal attitudes of humanity towards nature’, in H.O. Okura (ed.),
Philosophy, Humanity and Ecology (African Centre for Technology Studies Press, 1994),
290 at 293.
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and enlightening debate about complex and nuanced real-world ethical
issues’.117 Alternatively, leaving the environmental conduct of businesses
to managers’ discretionary judgement would likely not make companies
measurably accountable for their conduct.
While we should recognise a variety of values may inform sustainable
companies’ decision-making, they should be considered in a manner that
allows us to ethically reason, critique, and choose the best justified val-
ues.Defensible positions on sustainability emanate fromdecision-making
processes and forums that foster well-informed and nuanced evaluation
of the specific circumstances and rival values. The governance of com-
panies should open a space for such dialogue, for otherwise any sus-
tainability standards might be construed as simply imposed, extraneous
prescriptions. But it would also be naı¨ve to expect that more transparent,
democratic, and consultative decision-making in companies alone would
be transformative, given the power dynamics in business organisations
and market pressures. Thus, such decision-making must be bounded
within certain fundamental environmental performance standards. Fur-
thermore, beyond the level of individual businesses, processes to improve
consultation and transparency might be successfully embedded in gover-
nance frameworks that are pitched at entire industries or markets.
A ‘sustainable company’ therefore is one that not only respects national
and international environmental laws, but is also informed by a differ-
ent model of corporate and related business law that embeds within the
corporation the fundamental aim of respecting ecological constraints
and opportunities for its development. This sustainability envelope may
take the form of a number of legal mechanisms, including an overar-
ching duty to avoid environmental harm and the requirement to make
corporate governance more transparent and democratic with regard to
consideration of a firm’s environmental activities and impacts. A sustain-
able company is also embedded within a sustainable market system, in
which the investors and banks that fund business enterprise themselves
function under sustainability standards.
5 The Sustainable Companies Project
As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, this book reflects the work
of the Sustainable Companies Project, the name for a global research
117 W. Ransome and C. Sampford, Ethics and Socially Responsible Investment: A Philosophical
Approach (Ashgate, 2010), 54.
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107337978.003
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Deakin University, Australia (Books), on 12 Mar 2017 at 23:06:54, subject to the
capitalism, sustainability, business governance 27
network of scholars based at the University of Oslo that was launched in
2009 to improve our understanding of the intersection between business
and environmental law, notably through an analysis of company law to
identify barriers to and possibilities for the promotion of environmental
sustainability. The work of the Sustainable Companies Project is based,
as is this book, on three key assumptions.
First, while the exact impact of looming climate change, continued
biodiversity depletion, and unchecked social decay from the economic
challenges we face are hard to fully quantify and understand,118 we know
one thing for certain: business as usual is not an alternative. Enough has
already been said in this opening chapter about these environmental
threats and impacts. Suffice it to say here that incremental tinkering
with the governance of business and markets, while seemingly politically
attractive, will not stave off more serious ecological trauma and social
upheaval this century.
Second, to change to a sustainable path, we need business to contri-
bute.119 Clearly, our governments, even if they were brave and progres-
sive enough, cannot single-handedly adopt sustainability. The contri-
bution of business is needed, as a source of innovation and financial
resources. As Carol Liao’s penultimate Chapter 7 in this book conveys,
some companies are taking advantage of new legal templates to redesign
their business models to focus on contributing to the community. And
if business changes in the right direction, customers, employees, and,
indeed, whole societies may shift with them. As recognised by the seminal
1992 Earth Summit’s leading manual for sustainability – Agenda 21 – our
task requires multi-stakeholder collaboration with business playing an
especially prominent role in proportion to its environmental impacts and
the resources and expertise it can offer to forge solutions.120
The third key assumption that informs this book is that a voluntary
business response is not sufficient, and indeed it is anathema if voluntarism
is manipulated to avoid accountability or to deflect attention from seri-
ous action. CSR and SRI initiatives generally are insufficient to leverage
positive change, as David Millon in Chapter 2 and Benjamin Richardson
in Chapter 6 explain. Even worse, well-intended CSR or SRI initiatives
118 And there always will be, until we can describe the impact in retrospect, questions as
to the various prognoses: see e.g. ‘A sensitive matter’, The Economist (30 March 2013),
available at: www.economist.com.
119 As the European Commission also states: ‘Enterprises can significantly contribute to the
European Union’s treaty objectives of sustainable development and a highly competitive
social market economy’, COM (2011) 681 final, s. 1.2.
120 United Nations, Agenda 21 (3 vols), E. 92–38352, A/CONF. 151/26, 1992.
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can have the problematic effect of supporting the shareholder focus of
the mainstream corporate governance debate. CSR and SRI proponents
often direct arguments towards the shareholders and the management
and board of the company. This inevitably – albeit unwillingly – supports
a definition of the company as consisting of only shareholders, the board,
and management, which, in turn, through the influence of the corporate
governance debate, are seen as principals (shareholders) and agents (the
board and, by extension, management), respectively. This observation is
notmeant to trivialise how theCSR and SRImovements have significantly
contributed to bringing important issues on the impact of the companies
to the forefront of public discussion and the business agenda. However,
in spite of some convergence between mainstream corporate governance
thinking and the more critical CSR and SRI discourses, the dominant
perspective remains that companies’ and investors’ consideration of soci-
etal interests, outside of enforceable legal standards, is limited mainly to
discretionary business case considerations.
While the company as a legal form may be said to be one of the
most ingenious inventions of humanity, as a means for people to invest
resources and build wealth,121 the Sustainable Companies Project set out
to investigate whether there is something in the legal infrastructure of this
institution that contributes significantly to environmental degradation,
especially to dangerous climate change (impacts, which of course, in the
long run would undermine business success). The Project has focused
on analysing the barriers to and possibilities for enhanced environmental
protection and mitigation of climate change within the legal infrastruc-
ture for corporate decision-making. The corporate form dominates the
business world, not only in rich developed countries but also in emerging
economies. The aim of the analysis is to contribute to identifying what
prevents attention to climate change and other environmental issues in
corporate decision-making, and what might increase it. The hypothesis
informing the work of the Sustainable Companies Project is that regu-
lation of decision-making in business should be an indelible part of the
governance framework for sustainability. This emphasis is consistent with
the early conceptualisation of sustainability, such as at the seminal 1992
121 Whereas the enforceable contract may be the most innovative contribution of Roman
law, see A. Watson, ‘The evolution of law: the Roman system of contracts’ (1984) 2 Law
and History Review 1, company law may be said to have made a similar contribution
to the contemporary economy, see R.G. Rajan and L. Zingales, Saving Capitalism from
the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread
Opportunity (Crown Business, 2003).
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Earth Summit, which stressed the need to integrate environmental and
economic considerations into holistic decision-making.122
The work of the Sustainable Companies Project, which concluded in
2014, delved into the hitherto generally ignored area of company law to
ascertain the barriers to and possibilities for environmentally sustain-
able companies. On a comparative law basis, this involved a number of
well-documented methodological challenges.123 One issue is choice of
terminology. As explained in the comparative company law chapter by
Beate Sja˚fjell and others (Chapter 3), there is no common understanding
across jurisdictions of core company law concepts such as the purpose
of the company or the interests of the company. Often these concepts
are not expressly addressed in preparatory works, legislation, case law, or
legal doctrine. This makes in-depth analysis within each jurisdiction, and
especially comparative analysis across nations, difficult. The authors of
this chapter also found that there is a general lack of clarity and distinction
with regard to other fundamental concepts such as shareholder value and
shareholder primacy; the former used by the authors to denote a legal
duty and the latter a social norm. Company law in general appears to be
characterised by a discrepancy in terms of the relationship between law
in practice and law on the books. When academic commentators are not
always clear on whether they refer to the former or the latter, to corporate
practice or to the results of legal analysis, and when the underlying value
choices seem to be ignored, comparative analysis is extra challenging.
The working method of the Sustainable Companies Project has served
to mitigate some of these challenges. Team members from the various
jurisdictions have read and commented on each other’s work in order to
clarify concepts or terminology and share news of recent legal develop-
ments. A number of workshops and seminars were held where tentative
results were presented and discussed. Nevertheless, as with all work of
this kind, the comparative chapters of this book must be read with all the
caveats that this type of analysis involves.
Similarly, when it comes to recommending governance reforms to
move the business world closer to sustainability, members of the Sustain-
able Companies Project appreciate that sweeping, universal blueprints
for change are problematic. There are some guiding norms of collective
122 F. Dodds and M. Strauss, Only One Earth: The Long Road via Rio to Sustainable Develop-
ment (Earthscan, 2012), passim.
123 For example, M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Com-
parative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006).
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importance regarding the need to embed sustainability thinking in the
kernel of financial investing and corporate decision-making, but such
‘embedding’ can take a variety of permutations in different times and
places. A host of factors – political, cultural, and economic – as well as
local geographies and historical legacies, will require some accommo-
dation. Thus, the methods of designing reforms (such as processes for
dialogue and engagement with stakeholders) as well as the substantive
reform agenda (whether it be fiduciary law or corporate reporting, among
many issues) must be sensitive to the local context. A legal innovation in
one jurisdiction will not necessarily thrive in another, operating under
different circumstances and constraints. Yet, the Sustainable Companies
Project also has a great deal of faith in the value of transnational sharing
of experiences and ideas to help stimulate positive change in any part of
the world.
6 Synopsis of the book
This book comprises eight chapters that take the reader on a journey of
understanding of the barriers to and possibilities for sustainable com-
panies. The journey begins with an analysis of the limitations of current
governance approaches in the business world and thenmoves to a critique
of some recent solutions, such as social investing and corporate hybrid
structures, and concludeswith a distillation of themain challenges and the
paths ahead. The book’s nine contributors offer diverse expertise on busi-
ness and environmental law, aswell as insights from the variety of jurisdic-
tions that they represent: Australia (Richardson), Canada (Liao), Finland
(Ma¨ho¨nen), Norway (Anker-Sørensen and Sja˚fjell), the United Kingdom
(Johnston and Villiers), Ireland (Clarke), and the United States (Millon).
In addition, through their consideration of the numerous ‘mapping
papers’ of corporate law and sustainability authored by the many other
international participants to the Sustainable Companies Project, these
contributors present insights from a wider array of jurisdictions, such as
South Africa, India, Germany, and many more.
David Millon’s Chapter 2, ‘Corporate social responsibility and envi-
ronmental sustainability’, evaluates the potential for CSR to stimulate
commitment to environmental sustainability. Because domestic environ-
mental laws and regulations generally are inadequate for this task, CSR
offers the possibility of voluntary action to reduce the negative effects of
corporate activity on the environment and to invest in the development of
‘green’ products and services. Millon distinguishes between two models
that have dominated the CSR agenda: the ‘ethical’ and the ‘strategic’. The
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former evokes the notion that companies ought in some circumstances
to promote the interests of their non-shareholder stakeholders, even if
that detracts from financial returns to the company and its shareholders.
According to this view, this should be an ethical imperative rather than
a matter of discretionary philanthropy. Millon argues that the prospects
for ethical CSR depend greatly on the institutional context. In coun-
tries where shareholder primacy is strongly embedded in company law
or extra-legal social norms or where institutional investors are able to
insist on short-term financial returns, ethical CSR struggles to gain much
traction.Where, however, a stakeholder orientation ismore established in
corporate governance, the prospects are more promising. Millon surveys
three institutional contexts – Continental Europe, the United States, and
the United Kingdom – offering differing perspectives on this issue.
In contrast to ethical CSR, strategic CSR leads to investment in stake-
holder well-being in order to promote the company’s long-run economic
viability. Both shareholders and non-shareholders stand to gain, so this
version of CSR has the potential to overcome objections based on share-
holder primacy. Two caveats are made. First, shareholders may still object
if they are unwilling to tolerate the near-term costs of investment in stake-
holder well-being in return for financial benefits that will materialise, if
at all, only in the long run. Additionally, because the costs of strategic
CSR are justified by financial benefits, there is a built-in limit; companies
will invest in environmental sustainability and other stakeholder benefits
only if they perceive that they stand to profit. Corporate (and shareholder)
financial return is the relevant criterion, not aggregate social welfare, so
companies will probably not go far enough in meeting social needs. Until
law reform effectively addresses sustainability, the need to cultivate an
ethics-based model of CSR persists.
Chapter 3, ‘Shareholder primacy: the main barrier to sustainable com-
panies’, by Sja˚fjell et al., builds on the hypothesis informing thework of the
Sustainable Companies Project, that environmental sustainability should
be incorporated into the core regulation of business decision-making.
Beate Sja˚fjell, Andrew Johnston, Linn Anker-Sørensen, and David Millon
provide a comparative analysis of core features of company law – the rules
regulating the duties and purpose of corporate decision-makers – in eval-
uating the existing scope for integrating sustainable development, espe-
cially in its environmental dimension, into corporate decision-making.
Their analysis reveals much unexplored potential in current company
law regimes for companies to change from ‘business as usual’. No com-
pany law system mandates the fundamentalist narrow version of share-
holder profit maximisation that we see expressed in the social norm of
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‘shareholder primacy’. That social norm is the most formidable barrier to
core company law furthering sustainability. This norm is falsely perceived
as supported by company law because that area of law focuses on the posi-
tion of shareholders. Shareholder primacy has been allowed to develop
in the absence of an explicit legal statement setting out the purpose of
companies and delineating the company interest, leaving the competence
and duty of the company organs, notably of the governing board, rather
vague. ‘Business as usual’ is driven by shareholder primacy, but is actually
detrimental to any shareholder withmore than a very short-termperspec-
tive on their investment, including institutional investors such as pension
funds. The shareholder primacy drive keeps mainstream legal reform on
a narrow, path-dependent track. In concluding that corporate law reform
is necessary, the authors acknowledge that on its own it cannot engender
revolutionary change; rather, it must be nested within a wider mosaic
of sustainability governance initiatives. Such reform should include an
express redefinition of the purpose of companies and its implications
for the role, duties, and liability of the board. This has the potential to
make more effective the external regulation of companies and realise the
potential within each company to make its own independent, creative,
and active contribution to society’s transformation to sustainability.
The analysis of corporate boards of directors is continued in Blanaid
Clarke’s more specialised Chapter 4, ‘The role of board directors in pro-
moting environmental sustainability’. She discusses the role that boards
and individual directors can play in ensuring that their companies act
in a manner that promotes sustainability. Clarke considers how this role
has developed in recent times with a view to what is expected of boards
and what discretion is afforded to them in this respect. She describes the
manner in which corporate boards are regulated, with particular empha-
sis on UK and EU-level regulation. The chapter examines the evolution
of the role of non-executive directors and considers their role in embed-
ding sustainability within the business organisational framework. Clarke
considers the necessary attributes and skills of non-executive directors
that may allow them to fulfil this role (such as independence, diversity,
expertise and personal integrity, and character).
In Chapter 5, ‘Accounting, auditing and reporting: supporting or
obstructing the sustainable companies objective?’, Charlotte Villiers and
Jukka Ma¨ho¨nen discuss whether and how corporate reporting and audit-
ing requirements encompass the environmental performance of business
activity. If we expect companies to be more mindful of their environmen-
tal impact, they and their stakeholders must be able to understand the
environmental performance and impacts of business. There is a strong
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and well-established corporate financial accounting culture worldwide,
but few jurisdictions appear to have developed robust accounting for envi-
ronmental performance. While the authors acknowledge the potential of
accounting and reporting to improve corporate environmental perfor-
mance, they find that these mechanisms, if poorly designed, can hinder
such improvements. The chapter explores the barriers and possibilities
for improved sustainability through accounting and reporting as well as
related audit and other quality assurance processes. Through its cross-
jurisdictional analysis, with particular reference to EU Member States,
Villiers and Ma¨ho¨nen identify a more progressive role for sustainability-
focused reporting and auditing.
The book’s next two chapters examine the impact and potential of some
recent innovations in the business world that purport to offer new path-
ways to sustainability: the movement for socially responsible or ethical
investing (SRI) and its accompanying legal reforms, and the development
of new legal templates for corporate ‘hybrids’ that mandate community
contributions in addition to profit-making goals.
In Chapter 6, ‘Financial markets and socially responsible investing’,
Benjamin Richardson extends the analysis beyond regular companies in
the productive economy, which the other chapters in this book discuss,
to these companies’ investors or financiers. Richardson investigates how
the financial sector shapes the environmental performance of the econ-
omy, and assesses whether the rising global movement for SRI can foster
sustainable companies in the absence of credible governmental regula-
tion. The chapter closely examines five areas of potential SRI influence:
(1) changing the cost of capital to companies; (2) making SRI finan-
cially advantageous to investors; (3) engaging with companies through
dialogue and shareholder activism; (4) enacting voluntary SRI codes; and
(5) leveraging change through public policy and legal reform. The princi-
pal argument is that the financial sector continues to cast amostly negative
environmental impact, and SRI so far has had a rather muted remedial
influence. SRI will likely only acquire greater significance through a more
enabling regulatory and public policy framework, and existing efforts of
social investors to collaborate with governments appear to be the most
promising pathway for this movement to engender change.
A similarly cautious tone is evident in Carol Liao’s perspicacious anal-
ysis of the ‘Limits to corporate reform and alternative legal structures’
(Chapter 7). She explores the potential of a new wave of legal reforms in
North America and the UK to establish corporate ‘hybrids’ that combine
the goals of business profits and community contributions. These reforms
build on the cooperative model, the oldest corporate structure in history.
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While the cooperative has been recognised by the UN as playing a criti-
cal role in economic development and social innovation throughout the
world,124 it has, for several reasons, not had the success its model might
seem to warrant. The new breed of alternative legal structures – called
corporate ‘hybrids’ – not only enable, but require, CSR concepts to be
embodied within corporate practices. However, there is no legal obliga-
tion on any company to transform itself into a corporate hybrid – thus
the potential for this model to nudge companies towards sustainability
is highly debatable when the option of remaining a for-profit business
persists. Nonetheless, Liao argues that corporate hybrids may help stim-
ulate positive change despite the onerous barriers facing reformation of
the shareholder primacy model. These barriers identified by her include
entrenched ideological beliefs that have permeated the psyche of corpo-
rate governance practices in global capital markets, and path dependence
in narrowing legal reform. Liao’s analysis of corporate hybrid reforms
in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom explores some
of the main types of hybrids, their governance features that attempt to
accommodate and unite both the for-profit and non-profit agendas, the
reasons behind these features, the main challenges that implementation
of these models face, and their overall potential impact.
The book concludes with a pithy Chapter 8, ‘The future of company
law and sustainability’, in which Beate Sja˚fjell and Benjamin Richardson
distil the principal findings of the book, place them in the broader con-
text of the sustainability discourse, and outline priority policy goals and
governance reforms that states and non-state actors should embrace so
that the business community can make a more positive contribution to
the shared task of seeking environmental sustainability. The kernel of
such reform rests on redefining the fundamental purpose of the company
and the duties of those who manage and supervise it. The core challenge
of climbing the sustainability mountain is to inculcate in the decision-
making of economic and other societal actors the imperative to act for
the long term.
124 United Nations, ‘International year of cooperatives’, available at: http://social.un.org/
coopsyear.
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